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LONG LIVE LIFE SETTLEMENTS: THE 
CURRENT STATUS AND PROPOSED 
DIRECTION OF THE LIFE SETTLEMENT 
MARKET 
The payment of life insurance policy benefits to the insured’s suriving 
spouse or child is something with which most people are both familiar 
and comfortable.  However, when those benefits are instead paid to a 
third party investor who has no interest in the insured’s life, some people 
cry foul.  Yet this is the basic premise of the secondary market for life 
insurance.  In this market, insured individuals assign their policy benefits 
to an investor who agrees to pay the insured a lump sum of money in 
addition to assuming responsibility for the policy’s premiums.    
While the underlying concepts that support the secondary market for 
life insurance policies are not new, the young and imperfectly regulated 
market has been strained by an increase in supply and demand for these 
products.  Because of the limited guidance within the market, fraud and 
uncertainty have pervaded many transactions.  As a result, many validly 
settled policies may face challenges in the courts. 
In an effort to help stabilize and legitimize the secondary market, this 
Comment recommends coupling a strict judicial interpretation of the 
incontestability periods contained in many life insurance policies with a 
five year holding period on newly issued life insurance policies.  This 
framework will help deter fraudulent transactions while promoting 
certainty among investors. 
 
I.    INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 915
II.    LIFE SETTLEMENTS IN CONTEXT ................................................... 917
A.   How Life Settlements Fit into the Broader Insurance 
Market ......................................................................................... 917
B.   The Life Settlement Participants and Process ......................... 920
1.  The Sell Side ......................................................................... 921
2.  The Buy Side ......................................................................... 922
3.  Finalizing the Deal ............................................................... 924
C.   Development of the Secondary Life Insurance Market—
Booms ......................................................................................... 924
D.   Development of the Secondary Life Insurance Market—
Busts ............................................................................................ 928
12 KOUTNIK (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2013  5:11 PM 
914 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:913 
E.   The Impact of the Secondary Life Insurance Market on 
the Primary Life Insurance Market .......................................... 931
III.    JUDICIAL AND INSURANCE INDUSTRY EFFORTS 
REGARDING THE SECONDARY LIFE INSURANCE MARKET ...... 934
A.   Case Law—Examples from Delaware and New York ........... 934
1.  Delaware ............................................................................... 934
2.  New York .............................................................................. 941
B.   Insurance Industry Regulation Efforts .................................... 944
IV.    LOOKING FORWARD: THE BENEFITS OF A MARKET-BASED 
APPROACH ........................................................................................ 946
V.    CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 950
 
 
  
12 KOUTNIK (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2013  5:11 PM 
2013] LIFE SETTLEMENT MARKET 915 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Most Americans have some familiarity with life insurance policies.1  
Countless beneficiaries have relied on the critical safety net that a life 
insurance policy provides to guide their families through not only the 
loss of a loved one but also the loss of the family’s breadwinner.  To 
illustrate, a recently married couple expecting its first baby may consider 
purchasing life insurance policies.  These policies will help ensure that, 
even if something tragic occurs to one parent, the surviving family 
members will be left with some support. 
If, however, the family is able to avoid tragedy, the parents may at 
some point in the future be left with a policy into which they no longer 
wish to pay premiums.  Until relatively recently, most owners of 
unwanted life insurance policies had two options.2  First, the owner 
could stop paying premiums and simply allow the policy to lapse.3  
Second, the policy owner could cancel the policy and recover any cash 
surrender value that exists on the policy.4 
Policy owners now have a third option: a life settlement.5  In its most 
basic form, a life settlement is a transaction where the policy owner sells 
the policy to a third party for an amount greater than the policy’s cash 
surrender value but less than the expected payout to the beneficiary 
upon the policy owner’s death.6  Therefore, a life settlement creates a 
secondary market that exploits an inefficiency to achieve a mutual 
economic benefit.  On one hand, a policy owner with an unwanted 
policy can get more than the policy’s cash surrender value; on the other 
hand, a third party can make a sizable gain.7 
 
1. Leslie Scism, More Go Without Life Insurance, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2010, at C1 
(stating that only one-third of U.S. households do not have some form of life insurance). 
2. PAUL J. WINN, VIATICAL AND LIFE SETTLEMENTS: THE LIFE INSURANCE 
SECONDARY MARKET 1 (2008–2010). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. See infra Part II. 
6. STAFF REP. TO U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, LIFE SETTLEMENTS TASK FORCE 3 
(2010) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].  The payment will vary depending on a variety of factors.  
See infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.  A study by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office found that individuals who settle a life insurance policy on the 
secondary market receive nearly eight times the cash settlement value.  See Press Release, 
Life Settlement Institute, GAO Study Finds that Life Settlements Deliver Almost 8 times 
Surrender Value to Seniors (July 28, 2010), available at http://lifesettlementinstitute.org/articl
es/article16.html.   
7. See generally Michael K. Stanley, Boomers Ready for Life Settlement Option, 
LIFEHEALTHPRO (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2012/01/26/boomers-ready-
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This Comment provides an effective approach to promote the 
development of both an efficient and legal secondary marketplace for 
life insurance policies.  Specifically, this Comment will discuss how to rid 
the life settlement market of stranger-originated life insurance (STOLI) 
policies so that legitimate and beneficial life settlements between 
competent parties can occur in an environment free of fraud and legal 
uncertainty.8  Such an effort cannot be accomplished without an 
understanding of the life settlement market and the areas of law that are 
relevant to that market. 
To provide this background, Part II of this Comment will discuss the 
life settlement industry in greater detail, beginning with a review of 
participants on both the sell side and the buy side as well as the process 
by which a life insurance policy progresses through the secondary 
market.  Part II also includes an examination of the relationship 
between the primary insurance market and the secondary market. 
Part III examines the case law that is relevant to the examination of 
the life settlement market.  The analysis begins with the case law 
surrounding STOLI policies and provides insight into the concerns that 
courts have raised regarding STOLI policies.  The analysis then moves 
into life settlements by examining some of the important cases that 
serve as the foundation for the life settlement market.  After laying this 
foundation, the discussion advances into the current legal atmosphere in 
Delaware, with special emphasis placed on two recent Delaware 
Supreme Court cases.  These Delaware cases are then contrasted with 
the view taken by New York courts.  An examination of proposals by 
members of the insurance industry to establish a legitimate secondary 
market follows the judicial analysis.  This discussion focuses mostly on 
the model acts proposed by two industry groups: the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and the National 
Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL).   
 Part IV applies the different holdings and regulatory proposals to 
the secondary marketplace and determines that the New York rule 
 
for-life-settlement-option;  Deidre  Wengen,  More  Boomers  Selling  Life  Insurance  Plans 
to Fund Retirement, PHILLYBURBS.COM (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.phillyburbs.com/lifestyle/
young_heart/more-boomers-selling-life-insurance-plans-to-fund-retirement/article_d9dd4676-
4784-11e1-98eb-0019bb30f31a.html. 
8. See Mary Ann Mancini & Caitlin L. Murphy, The Elusive Insurable Interest 
Requirement: Are You Sure the Insured Is Insured?, 46 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 409, 441–
43 (2012) (providing an overview of the concerns arising out of the increasing prevalence of 
STOLI transactions). 
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helps provides a more desirable, market-driven outcome.  The 
discussion then advances by articulating the benefits of coupling the 
New York view on incontestability clauses with state adoption of a five-
year period where an insured, subject to certain “life events,” is barred 
from assigning a policy to a third party.  This approach would help rid 
STOLI policies from the secondary market and bring with it the 
certainty and legitimacy that the market desperately needs.  Finally, Part 
V offers a brief summary of this Comment’s discussion. 
II. LIFE SETTLEMENTS IN CONTEXT 
A. How Life Settlements Fit into the Broader Insurance Market 
The life insurance industry in the United States is massive.  Nearly 
$2.9 trillion worth of new life insurance coverage was purchased in 
2011.9  The total amount of life insurance in force totaled $19.2 trillion, 
representing a 4% increase from 2010.10  Of the $19.2 trillion total, 
individual life insurance coverage contributed nearly $11 trillion.11  The 
industry has an enormous impact on employment as well, with 807.9 
million people employed by life, health, and medical insurance 
companies in 2012.12  To provide some context, all components of the 
insurance industry, including agencies and brokerages, employed 2.3 
billion people.13 
Beyond just life insurance, the broader insurance market is 
composed of several different categories that are in turn comprised of a 
variety of sub-categories.  To illustrate the difference between two 
major kinds of insurance14—property/casualty and life/health 
insurance—imagine a car crash involving Alex, a fully insured person.  
The damage to Alex’s car and any other property would be covered by 
 
9. See AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 2012, at 63 (2012). 
10. Id. 
 11. Id.  The secondary market for individual life insurance policies is the focus of this 
Comment.   
12. Careers and Employment, INS. INFO. INST., http://www.iii.org/facts_statistics/careers-
and-employment.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2013). 
13. Id. 
14. Not discussed here or elsewhere in this Comment are various public insurance 
programs, like Medicare and Medicaid.  Furthermore, this Comment does not incorporate a 
discussion of group or commercial insurance.  For a discussion on these subjects, see 1 
STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 1:2 (rev. ed. 2009).  Instead, this 
Comment focuses on the secondary market for individual, personal life insurance.  See infra 
notes 37–41 and accompanying text. 
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his property and casualty insurance.15  Any injuries sustained by Alex 
during the accident would be covered by his health insurance.16  If Alex 
died during the car accident, his beneficiaries would receive the 
proceeds of his life insurance policy.17 
Because life settlements develop from life insurance policies, further 
understanding of the kinds of life insurance is important.  For the 
purposes of this Comment, three basic kinds of life insurance: term, 
endowment, and ordinary.18   
Term life insurance provides coverage for a specific term of time.19  
Premiums paid typically increase with the policyholder’s age, and if the 
policyholder survives past the policy’s term, the premiums paid are 
irretrievable.20 
Endowment life insurance strikes a balance between term life 
insurance and a savings account.21  Under this arrangement, a term of 
years is selected and periodic premium payments are made.22  If the 
policyholder dies before the term’s completion, the beneficiary receives 
the policy’s face value.23  Should the policyholder survive until the end of 
the term, however, the policyholder would receive the policy’s face 
 
15. See What is Property/Casualty Insurance?, ISO, http://www.iso.com/About-ISO/ISO-
Services-for-Property-Casualty-Insurance/What-Is-Property/Casualty-Insurance.html (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2013) (defining property/casualty insurance as “insurance on homes, cars, and 
businesses”). 
16. See 1 BERTRAM HARNETT & IRVING I. LESNICK, THE LAW OF LIFE AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE § 1.01 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2012) (defining health insurance as “a broad 
panoply of coverages for payments on account of accident, sickness, hospitalization, and 
disability”).  
17. See id. § 1.03.  Though referred to as being under the same umbrella, life and health 
insurance are typically memorialized in different policies.  Id. § 1.01. 
18. See id. § 1.03.  The treatise refers to four basic types of life insurance, but because 
limited payment life insurance is a type of whole-life insurance, there are, for the purposes of 
this Comment, only three. 
19. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1010–11 (9th ed. 2009); see also HARNETT & LESNICK, 
supra note 16, § 1.03 (“Term insurance . . . covers death during a limited term of years.”) 
20. HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 16, § 1.03 (“[I]n term life insurance the insured’s 
economic rights are exhausted and the premiums irretrievably paid out unless the insured dies 
during the policy term.”); Increasing Term Life Insurance—Useful for Some, 
LIFEINSURANCEHUB.NET, http://www.lifeinsurancehub.net/increasingpremiumtermlifeinsura
nce.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).  
21. Amy Fontinelle, The Pros of an Endowment Life Insurance Policy, YAHOO! FIN. 
(Jul. 19, 2012), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/pros-endowment-life-insurance-policy-
213847789.html; see also HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 16, at § 1.03 (“Endowment forms 
mark the transition from death protection to retirement protection.”).  
22. Fontinelle, supra note 21. 
23. HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 16, at § 1.03; Fontinelle, supra note 21.  
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value.24  These policies are common components in a college-savings 
plan that a parent establishes for a child.25 
Whole-life insurance policies are ordinary life insurance policies.26  
As opposed to a term life policy, a whole-life policy covers the insured 
until death and couples life insurance with a cash value account and 
annual dividend.27  In exchange, the policyholder makes premium 
payments28 during his entire lifetime.29  Limited payment life insurance 
policies offer a variation of whole-life policies by compressing premium 
payments into an abbreviated payment window.30  Under a limited 
payment life insurance policy, an insured may pay all premiums, for 
example, in one lump sum.31 
Furthermore, whole-life policies possess a cash surrender value,32 
which is defined as “[t]he amount of money payable when an insurance 
policy having cash value, such as a whole-life policy, is redeemed before 
maturity or death.”33  Surrendering the policy offers a way for the 
policyholder to cancel the policy while recovering a portion of the total 
premiums paid to the insurance company.34  Furthermore, most insurers 
impose a surrender charge that further erodes the discounted rate 
 
24. HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 16, at § 1.03.  For example,  
[I]n a $125,000 endowment policy, taken out at age thirty-five and payable at age 
sixty-five, the insured, if still alive at sixty-five, gets his $125,000 as endowment 
proceeds and the policy terminates.  On the other hand, if the insured had died at 
age forty-three, for instance, his beneficiary would have collected the $125,000 face 
amount as death benefit proceeds. 
Id. 
25. See Fontinelle, supra note 21. 
26. Howard J. Saks, Flexibility and Tax Advantages of Whole Life Insurance Are 
Valuable Features, EST. PLAN., Nov. 2009, at 23; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1010 
(9th ed. 2009) (defining ordinary life insurance as “[l]ife insurance having an investment-
sensitive cash value, such as a whole life insurance or universal life insurance”); id. at 1011 
(defining whole life insurance).  But cf. id. at 873 (defining group insurance); id. at 1010 
(defining industrial life insurance).  For additional information, see supra note 14 and 
accompanying text. 
27. Leslie Scism, Life Policies: The Whole Truth, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2012, at B8. 
28. These payments, along with broker costs, are often much higher for whole-life 
insurance than term life insurance.  See id. 
29. HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 16, at § 1.03; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1011 (defining whole life insurance). 
30. HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 16, at § 1.03. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1691 (9th ed. 2009). 
34. HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 16, § 1.03; PLITT ET AL., supra note 14, § 32:83. 
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received by the policyholder.35  Because of the relatively paltry cash 
surrender value, likely imposition of a surrender charge, and the 
potential tax implications associated with surrendering a policy, the 
eventual sum received will be minimal.  As a result, a window of mutual 
economic benefit exists for a policyholder and investor between the final 
cash settlement value of the policy and the face value of the policy. 
So what does this mean to someone looking to settle a life insurance 
policy?  Assume that Alex, our car accident victim from earlier, survives 
the car crash but several years later is diagnosed with a rare and 
aggressive form of leukemia.  Alex carries two life insurance policies, 
one valued at $1.5 million and the other valued at $1 million.  An 
experimental treatment exists for his leukemia, but due to its 
experimental nature, Alex’s health insurance does not cover the 
treatment.36  Willing to try anything to beat the leukemia, Alex talks to 
his wife (the policy’s listed beneficiary) and they decide to dispose of 
one policy to get the cash needed to afford the experimental treatment. 
Unfortunately, neither of Alex’s policies have a cash surrender value 
that is high enough to pay for the treatment.  Wary of surrendering both 
policies for a treatment that is not guaranteed to work, Alex enters the 
life settlement market to find an investor who will pay more than the 
cash surrender value of his policy but less than the policy’s benefits. 
B.  The Life Settlement Participants and Process 
The underlying concept of the life insurance secondary market is 
simple: transfer a policy from the owner to an investor.37  The secondary 
 
35. HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 16, at § 1.03.  Surrender charges are not, in 
themselves, “void as an unreasonable penalty, [or] against public policy.”  Jefferson Standard 
Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 129 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1942).  Some states, however, statutorily 
cap the percentage that insurance companies can charge through surrender charges.  See, e.g., 
N.Y. INS. LAW § 4220(a)(2)(B) (Consol. 2000) (fixing the limit on a surrender charge at two 
and a half percent of the policy’s face value). 
36. See Matt Stroud, U.S. Consumers Tell Insurers to Cover Experimental Drugs, 
REUTERS (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/23/us-drugs-
idUSTRE80M16520120123 (recounting a case where an insurer would not pay for the 
insured’s experimental treatment). 
37. The earlier described circumstance regarding the need for liquidity to treat a disease 
is only one of many potential reasons for seeking to settle a policy.  See Sam Rosenfeld, 
Life  Settlements:  Signposts  to  a  Principal  Asset  Class  11–12  (Univ.  of  Pa.  Wharton 
Sch.  Fin.  Insts.  Ctr.,  Working  Paper  No.  09–20,  2009),  available  at 
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/09/0920.pdf (other possibilities for settling a policy 
include the policy no longer being necessary and the premiums becoming unaffordable); 
A.M. BEST CO., CRITERIA—INSURANCE-LINKED SECURITIES 1 (2012), available at 
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life insurance market has been analogized to the real estate market 
where,38 though direct sales from seller to buyer sometimes occur,39 the 
process more commonly involves intermediaries serving as a conduit 
between the seller and buyer.40  In the secondary life insurance market, 
the common intermediaries include life settlement agents and brokers, 
life settlement providers, and life expectancy underwriters.41 
1. The Sell Side 
Policy owners will often be represented by a broker or an agent (and 
in some instances both) who will help the owner navigate the secondary 
insurance market.42  Because of the cloudy, and sometimes conflicting, 
regulations43 in the life settlement industry, the definition of who can 
serve as a broker may vary.44  For example, in states that regulate life 
settlements, a licensed life insurance agent can act as a life settlement 
broker, but financial planners, accountants, and lawyers cannot.45 
One of the tasks for life settlement brokers and agents—who are 
typically working for a fee or commission46—is to help the policy owner 
prepare the information necessary to sell a life insurance policy on the 
secondary market and to find potential purchasers.47  The life settlement 
application is an important piece in this puzzle.  The application requires 
 
http://www.ambest.com/debt/lifesettlement.pdf (listing reasons similar to Rosenfeld’s and 
including the need for cash following a bankruptcy or to fund new annuities, life insurance, or 
investments). 
38. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-775, LIFE INSURANCE 
SETTLEMENTS: REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES MAY POSE A NUMBER OF CHALLENGES 
19–29 (2010) [hereinafter REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES] (providing an overview of the 
life settlement broker’s role); Sachin Kohli, Comment, Pricing Death: Analyzing the 
Secondary Market for Life Insurance Policies and its Regulatory Environment, 54 BUFF. L. 
REV. 279, 282 (2006); Glenn S. Daily, What Is a Reasonable Broker’s Commission?, GLENN S. 
DAILY (June 28, 2006), http://www.glenndaily.com/wmpwrb5a.htm (relying on typical real 
estate broker’s commission to offer advice on reasonable life settlement broker’s 
commission). 
39. See REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES, supra note 38, at 26. 
40. Id.; see also TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 7–8 (discussing the various market 
intermediaries used). 
41. See REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES, supra note 38, at 26. 
42. Id. at 28–29; Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 12. 
43. See infra Part III. 
44. See REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES, supra note 38, at 28. 
45. Id. 
46. The fee or commission is a negotiated term between the policy owner and the broker 
or agent.  Id. at 29. 
47. Id. at 28–29. 
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the compilation of information regarding the life insurance policy, the 
policy owner, the insured’s primary physicians, and the insured’s 
medical records for the past several years.48 
Critically, the agent or broker also serves as the policy owner’s 
liaison to the buy side of the life settlement process.49  The agent or 
broker reaches out to multiple life settlement providers50 in an effort to 
find an ideal purchaser of the owner’s policy.51  The expertise of a broker 
is especially valuable here, since the broker will have a better idea of 
which life settlement providers have portfolios or demand for the type 
of policy that the owner is looking to settle.52 
2. The Buy Side 
Just as policy owners typically rely on brokers to help navigate the 
secondary market for life insurance, investors and financial institutions 
in the life settlement marketplace generally use life settlement providers 
to locate and bid on attractive life insurance policies.53  The provider will 
examine many factors that impact the size of the payout from the policy.  
These concerns can range from the financial stability of the insurance 
company that issued the policy,54 to the probability that the issuing 
insurance company will challenge the validity of the policy following a 
settlement,55 and, of course, to the size of the policy’s face value.56  
Additionally, the longer the settling individual lives, the more premiums 
 
48. WINN, supra note 2, at 15–16; see also LIFE INS. SETTLEMENT ASS’N, THE BASICS OF 
LIFE SETTLEMENTS: AN EDUCATIONAL GUIDE FOR CONSUMERS (2012) (discussing the 
application process).  
49. See Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 12. 
50. Id.; see A.M. BEST CO., supra note 37, at 2. 
51. See Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 12; see also TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 7 (“Once 
the application materials are complete, the settlement broker will offer or ‘bid’ the contract to 
a number of providers to obtain a range of provider offers.”). 
52. See TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 7 (“[T]he settlement broker in some instances may 
be the same insurance agent who sold the policy to the policy owner.  In other cases, a broker 
may work with a variety of insurance agents or other financial professional to solicit interest 
from policy owners.”). 
53. See A.M. BEST CO., supra note 37, at 2. 
54. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 8; see also WINN, supra note 2, at 19 (explaining that 
the expected percentage of the policy’s death benefit offered as a settlement amount “would 
generally be reduced if the insurer on the policy is lower rated”). 
55. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 8.  Challenging the validity of the contract following a 
settlement typically rests on a lack of insurable interest argument.  Id.; see also infra Part III.  
The lack of standardized regulation presents further opportunities for legal challenges to 
what may be valid settlements.  See infra Part III. 
56. REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES, supra note 38, at 33. 
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the investor will have to pay.  These additional premiums further erode 
the investor’s eventual payout and tie up capital.  Therefore, given its 
direct impact on the size of the payout, the individual’s life expectancy 
serves as the most critical variable in valuing a life insurance policy on 
the secondary market.57 
Life expectancy underwriters play a critical role in the life settlement 
process by helping to ameliorate the possibility that an investor will be 
required to pay more premiums than anticipated.58  To accomplish this 
important task, underwriters gather information from multiple, and in 
some cases specialized, sources.  For example, underwriters will 
generally solicit a physician to review the medical history of the policy 
owner and make a recommendation.59  To ensure accuracy, the 
underwriter may employ another physician to review the first 
physician’s recommendation.60 
Furthermore, when determining the life expectancy, underwriters 
also use special methods that are less formulaic than what the life 
insurance industry uses because the pool used in life insurance 
underwriting is typically much younger and healthier than those in the 
secondary life insurance market.61  By using these techniques, life 
settlement underwriters are able to compensate for diseases that move 
faster in older populations and impairments that, given an individual’s 
age, will not have time to become life threatening.62  All of these 
techniques are used to determine a mean life expectancy for the insured, 
which allows providers to assign the policy its proper value.63 
Once the underwriter finishes its examination, the provider will 
review the information and either reject the policy or make an offer.64  If 
 
57. See A.M. BEST CO., supra note 37, at 1 (“The higher the medical impairment of an 
insured . . . the higher the price paid for the insurance policy.”). 
58. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 8. 
59. Id. at 9. 
60. See id. 
61. Id. at 8 (“Different methodologies are used because life insurance underwriting is 
generally limited to a younger population with limited medical impairments whereas life 
expectancy underwriting is used with an older population who may have multiple significant 
impairments.”). 
62. See id. at 9 (listing three common adjustments to align the life insurance debit 
methodology with the life settlement demographic). 
63. Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 13.  The multiple sources and techniques utilized also 
result in estimates varying from provider to provider, making the broker’s task of generating 
multiple bids an important one.  See WINN, supra note 2, at 18. 
64. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 9. 
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the life expectancy of the policy owner is relatively short, the provider 
will be willing to pay more for the policy for numerous reasons: the 
number of premiums that the investor will have to pay is fewer, the 
investor will receive payment sooner, and the risk is theoretically less.65  
As a result, a lower life expectancy results in a higher cash settlement, 
which benefits each intermediary in the market. 
3.  Finalizing the Deal 
If the insured accepts the provider’s offer, the insurer changes the 
ownership of the policy and transfers it to an escrow agent who pays the 
seller.66  Once the seller is paid, most states require a rescission period 
whereby the seller can pull out of the deal.67  Upon completion of the 
transfer, the investor takes control of the premium payments.68  To help 
with this process, a specialized tracking agency ensures that the 
individual who settled his policy is still alive before the payment of each 
premium.69  Once the policy matures (that is, the individual who settled 
the policy dies) the investor receives the benefit of the policy.70 
C. Development of the Secondary Life Insurance Market—Booms 
The United States Supreme Court laid the foundation for the life 
insurance secondary market over a century ago with its decision in 
 
65. See WINN, supra note 2, at 19.  For a life expectancy of less than six months, an 
expected percentage of the policy’s death benefit offered as a bid may be around 80%.  Id.  
For a life expectancy of two years or greater, the expected bid drops to 50% of the policy’s 
death benefit.  Id. 
66. Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 13. 
67. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.15-715(5) (LexisNexis 2011) (“All life 
settlement contracts entered into in this state shall contain an unconditional right to rescind a 
life settlement contract before the earlier of thirty (30) calendar days after the date it is 
executed or fifteen (15) calendar days after the date of receipt of the proceeds of the life 
settlement contract by the owner.”); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7813(g)(1) (Consol. Supp. 2012) 
(“Every life settlement contract shall provide that the owner has an unconditional right to 
rescind the life settlement contract from the time of execution of the contract until fifteen 
days after the receipt of the life settlement proceeds . . . .”); WIS. STAT. § 632.69(8)(f) (2009–
2010) (“[T]he owner has a right to rescind a life settlement contract before the earlier of 30 
calendar days after the date upon which the life settlement contract is executed by all parties 
or 15 calendar days after the life settlement proceeds have been paid to the owner . . . .”). 
68. See Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 13. 
69. Id.; see, e.g., Services, TRACK-LIFE, http://www.track-life.com/index.php (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2013) (explaining that Track-Life “give[s] life settlement providers and other policy 
owners an alternative means to manage” the effective tracking, managing, and monitoring of 
a portfolio of policies). 
70. Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 13. 
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Grigsby v. Russell.71  In Grigsby, a man named John Bruchard took out a 
life insurance policy.72  In year three of his policy, while in desperate 
need of money, Bruchard sold his life insurance policy to Grigsby.73  In 
consideration of the deal, Grigsby purchased the policy for $100 and the 
duty to pay the future premiums.74 
The Court discussed that Grigsby had no insurable interest in 
Bruchard’s life, defining insurable interest as having “an interest in 
having the life [of the insured] continue[,] and so one that is opposed to 
crime.”75  The Court suggested that the holder of a valid life insurance 
policy should be able to transfer the policy to “one whom [the insured], 
the party most concerned, is not afraid to trust.”76  In other words, the 
Court determined that a policyholder has the right to assign the policy 
to whomever the policyholder so chooses and that an assignee does not 
need to have an insurable interest in the assignor.77  Furthermore, the 
Court categorized life insurance policies as property.78  By providing that 
individuals can assign life insurance policies to third parties that do not 
have an insurable interest in the insured, and by categorizing life 
insurance policies as property, the Supreme Court provided important 
principles to the future life settlement market. 
The Grigsby decision paved the way for the development of the 
viatical settlement market during the AIDS crisis in the 1980s.79  Viatical 
 
71. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911). 
72. Id. at 154. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 155. 
76. Id. 
77. See id. at 157.  One of the first instances of the court addressing the assignment of a 
life insurance policy occurred in Warnock v. Davis.  104 U.S. 775 (1881).  Warnock involved 
the assignment of a life insurance policy to an individual with no insurable interest who 
agreed to pay the premiums.  See id. at 779.  The Court considered this agreement to be a 
wager policy and held it invalid.  Id.  Importantly, the Court went even further and stated that 
“[t]he assignment of a policy to a party not having an insurable interest is as objectionable as 
the taking out of a policy in his name.”  Id.  Grigsby back-tracked on the Warnock decision 
and added to the foundation for the eventual creation of the life settlement market.  See 
Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 157.  For a more thorough discussion and context on these cases, see 
supra Part III.A.1.   
78. Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 156. 
79. See, e.g., Susan Lorde Martin, Betting on the Lives of Strangers: Life Settlements, 
STOLI, and Securitization, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 173, 174 (2010); Eli Martin Lazarus, Note, 
Viatical and Life Settlement Securitization: Risks and Proposed Regulation, 29 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 253, 254 (2010); see also NIH Researchers Recall the Early Years of AIDS, NAT’L 
INSTS. OF HEALTH, http://history.nih.gov/NIHInOwnWords/docs/page_26.html (last visited 
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settlements target policy owners who are terminally ill—usually defined 
as having a life expectancy less than two years.80  When an individual is 
terminally ill, future costs are limited and the “risk-adjusted value of the 
death benefit” greatly exceeds a policy’s surrender value.81  Shortly after 
its discovery, the AIDS mortality rate for identified cases was 
approximately ninety-three percent in 1981 and eighty-nine percent in 
1982.82  AIDS patients required money for the high cost of treatment 
and—given high mortality rates—investors saw an opportunity to make 
money by providing a portion of the patient’s life insurance benefit in 
exchange for becoming the policy’s beneficiary.83  However, because the 
medical community began to make strides in the treatment of 
HIV/AIDS, extending the lives of those infected with the HIV virus,84 
the secondary life insurance market shifted its focus to other terminal 
diseases, like cancer and Lou Gehrig’s disease.85 
The secondary market then began to develop in another direction, 
shifting its focus beyond only individuals with terminal illness to senior 
citizens with non-terminable diseases.86  This second type of policy 
owner falls under the life settlement category.  These policies are owned 
by seniors between sixty and eighty years old who have stable spouses 
and children and large annual insurance premiums.87  In turn, a third 
market, this time fraudulent, grew from the life settlement market: the 
STOLI policy market.88  This market sought senior citizens who would 
take out a life insurance policy with the intent to then sell that policy on 
the secondary market.89 
In terms of value, the life insurance secondary market has grown 
significantly from its modest viatical settlement roots.  In 1989, an 
 
Mar. 25, 2013). 
80. A.M. BEST CO., supra note 37, at 1. 
81. Neil A. Doherty & Hal J. Singer, The Benefits of a Secondary Market for Life 
Insurance Policies 2 (Univ. of Pa. Wharton Sch. Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 02–41, 
2002), available at http://www.carnegieassociatesltd.com/articles/Wharton.pdf. 
82. WINN, supra note 2, at 4. 
83. See TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 3. 
84. See Global Summary of the AIDS Epidemic 2011, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/hiv/data/2012_epi_core_en.png (last visited Mar. 25, 2013). 
85. Martin, supra note 79, at 185–86. 
86. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 4; WINN, supra note 2, at 5. 
87. WINN, supra note 2, at 5; Martin, supra note 79, at 186. 
88. See Mancini & Murphy, supra note 8, at 438–39. 
89. Id. at 439; Martin, supra note 79, at 186. 
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estimated $5 million in life insurance policies were settled.90  By 1998, 
that number rose to $200 million.91  This high rate of growth continued 
until the 2008 financial crisis: in 2005 the value of settled policies jumped 
to about $10 billion before peaking in 2007 at about $12 billion.92 
Both investors and Wall Street were excited about the growth in the 
young market.93  Research firm Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. predicted in 
2007 that the face value of life settlement deals would exceed $160 
billion.94  The insurance industry research firm Conning Research and 
Consulting estimated that by 2016 the face value of life insurance 
policies settled in the secondary market would be between $90 and $140 
billion.95 
These high expectations were based on several factors, not the least 
being that the deals provide a payment upon an event that is certain to 
happen.96  In the investment world, such certainty can be hard to find.  
Given such certainty, if investment banks could effectively securitize life 
settlements, the detrimental effect of individuals who survive past their 
life expectancy would be offset by other individuals in the “portfolio” 
who die sooner than anticipated.  This arrangement made consistent and 
significant returns seem within reach.97  Generally, life settlement assets 
were projected to return between nine percent and thirteen percent to 
investors.98 
The fact that these returns are known as “uncorrelated returns” 
offers a second benefit.  An uncorrelated asset generates returns 
independently of the market.99  That is to say, even if the market is 
plunging, people are still going to die.  Therefore, it was believed that 
 
90. Martin, supra note 79, at 186. 
91. Id. 
92. See TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 4; Matthew Goldstein, Profiting from Mortality, 
BUSINESSWEEK, July 30, 2007, at 44, 46. 
93. Goldstein, supra note 92, at 46. 
94. Id. 
95. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 4. 
96. Everyone dies.  The only uncertainty is when the person will die and, in turn, when 
the investor will get paid.  The same cannot be said about the direction of a particular stock or 
bond. 
97. Goldstein, supra note 92, at 48. 
98. Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 11.  Such returns are especially attractive since from 
1926 to 1998 the realized—that is, actual—rate of return on equities was 5.2%.  Peter A. 
Diamond, What Stock Market Returns to Expect for the Future?, 63 SOC. SECURITY BULL., 
no. 2 2000, at 38, 38. 
99. Goldstein, supra note 92, at 46. 
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institutional investors would find securitized life settlement products 
especially attractive, perhaps serving as a way to hedge riskier bets made 
elsewhere by the firm.100  This hedging ability is an intrinsic benefit that 
life settlement assets offer to investors that does not appear in the 
expected rate of return. 
Yet another consideration that went into the expected growth of the 
life settlement market was the changing demographic makeup of the 
United States.101  In just ten years, from 2010 to 2020, the number of 
Americans sixty-five years of age and over is expected to grow by thirty-
six percent, from about forty million to about fifty-five million.102  
Similarly, and likely of more interest to the life settlement market, the 
number of people aged eighty-five and over is expected to increase by 
about fifteen percent from 2010 to 2020.103  The ranks of the elderly will 
soon begin to swell in the United States.104  It seems that there will be 
many opportunities for life settlements in the future, making the 
development of a stable and legitimate marketplace especially 
important.   
D. Development of the Secondary Life Insurance Market—Busts 
Despite these benefits, the life settlement market’s rate of growth 
has fallen short of some Wall Street expectations.105  In 2008, with the 
market continuing its upward trend, the life settlement market was 
estimated at $15 billion.106  Then, in 2009, the market plunged to an 
estimated $7 billion of settled policies.107  At the same time, some of the 
major banks that had entered the life settlement market—including 
Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank—began to pull back.108 
 
100. Id.; see also Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 11. 
101. See Goldstein, supra note 92, at 50. 
102. See Projected Future Growth of the Older Population, ADMIN. ON AGING, 
http://www.aoa.gov/AoARoot/Aging_Statistics/future_growth/future_growth.aspx (last 
updated June 23, 2010). 
103. Id. 
104. See Bill Glauber, 65-and-Older Numbers Jump 10%, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, 
Dec. 1, 2011, at 5B (stating that, nationally, the number of Americans 65 and older increased 
by 5.3 million from 2000 to 2010 and that older populations grew faster than the general 
population). 
105. See Goldstein, supra note 92, at 46 (explaining Wall Street’s hope of “turning most 
of the life settlements created each year into death bonds”). 
106. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 4. 
107. Id. 
108. Matthew Goldstein, Deutsche Kicks the Grim Reaper, BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 30, 
2009), http://www.businessweek.com/investing/wall_street_news_blog/archives/2009/01/deutsc
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Such a pullback was not completely unforeseen given the economic 
and credit conditions of 2009.109  Along with the loss of confidence in the 
financial system came a lockup in financing and liquidity.110  Thus, assets 
that require significant payment of capital up-front—like life insurance 
policies, which usually have premiums around five to ten percent of face 
value per year111—and take several years to pay off were not particularly 
attractive to investors in an environment where capital was extremely 
difficult to secure.112 
While a lack of liquidity certainly contributed to the industry’s 
malaise, the more damning issue seems to be the inherent negative 
connotation associated with an investor profiting from the death of a 
disinterested third party, especially when this result is achieved in a 
fraudulent way.113  Because the market is not as well regulated as the 
insurance and securities markets, brokers have an easier time altering, 
or lying about, expected costs and returns to make the products appear 
more appealing.114 
To illustrate, consider the case of Curtis Somoza and Robert 
Coberly.115  In 2004, these two California men orchestrated a $64 million 
Ponzi scheme using life settlements.116  The men promised investors a 
25% return on a “sophisticated bond trading program[]” that involved 
 
he_kicks.html; Darla Mercado, Goldman Sachs Abandoning Life Settlements Market, 
INVESTMENTNEWS (Jan. 29, 2010), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20100129/FREE/
100129850. 
109. See Scott Lanman, Bernanke Warns of Credit Market ‘Relapse,’ BLOOMBERG 
(May 5, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aNX4ZbLkEXt
A (explaining that, although the credit market was showing signs of bottoming after a three 
year decline, “unprecedented” efforts to boost credit by the Federal Reserve were likely to 
continue); Ari Levy & Caroline Salas, Obama Becomes Banker–in–Chief in 
Credit Market Freeze, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 20, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pi
d=newsarchive&sid=aBKDYyojIxfk (quoting Kenneth Rosen as stating that “[u]nfreezing 
credit ‘is the single most important thing’” for then President–Elect Obama). 
110. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
111. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 4. 
112. Id. at 5. 
113. Particularly, the advent of the STOLI market created a nuanced, but fraudulent, 
version of a life settlement. 
114. See Goldstein, supra note 92, at 46. 
115. Martin Zimmerman, Westlake Village Man Sentenced in $44-Million Ponzi Scheme, 
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/05/business/fi-ponzi5. 
116. Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Westlake Village Man Who 
Orchestrated $64 Million Ponzi Scheme Sentenced to 25 Years in Federal Prison (Nov. 3, 
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/cac/Pressroom/pr2009/128.html [hereinafter 
FBI Press Release]. 
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purchasing $275,000 life insurance policies and paying premiums on 
behalf of around 2,000 members of an inner Los Angeles church.117  
From there, the policy that was taken out on each individual would be 
split in three parts upon the death of the covered individual: $15,000 
would go to the deceased’s family, $20,000 would go to the church 
group, and $240,000 to a trust that would be used to pay premiums and 
pay investors.118  Investors liked what they heard because it was sold as a 
“risk-free” investment opportunity that promised large returns.119  The 
pastor of the church group approved because both the members of his 
group and the organization itself would benefit.120  Somoza and Coberly 
especially liked the scheme because the investors’ money went right into 
their pockets and allowed the two to live out what the sentencing judge 
deemed “an orgy of self-indulgence.”121  On his own, Somoza spent $27 
million in sixteen months.122  However, as some investors began 
requesting their money, Somoza and Coberly could only return about 
$28 million before the scheme fell apart.123 
Somoza and Coberly are hardly the only individuals to conduct 
questionable, and in many instances illegal, practices in the life 
settlement market.124  As the director of enforcement for the Texas State 
Securities Board stated, an “absolutely unreal” amount of fraud exists in 
the life settlement arena.125  Thus, Somoza and Coberly’s scheme is 
illustrative of numerous problems that have plagued the young market.  
These men took advantage of a regulatory hole by claiming that the 
investment was “risk-free” and by offering 25% percent returns.126  
Additionally, there is an especially wide information gap between 
 
117. Id.; Goldstein, supra note 92, at 49. 
118. See FBI Press Release, supra note 116. 
119. See id. 
120. See Goldstein, supra note 92, at 49. 
121. FBI Press Release, supra note 116. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. See, e.g., Leslie Scism, Regulators Crack Down on Murky Life-Insurance Policies, 
WALL ST. J., June 22, 2010, at D1 (providing the example of Steven Brasner, a Florida 
insurance sales agent who arranged STOLI transactions for hedge funds and inserted false 
wealth and other information on the insurance application). 
125. Rob Curran, The Pros and Cons of Betting on Death, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2010, at 
R7. 
126. FBI Press Release, supra note 116.  Industry groups have addressed some of these 
problems by, for example, proposing regulation on advertising that would eliminate the use of 
words like “free” or “no cost” insurance.  See infra note 246 and accompanying text. 
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investors and brokers.127  Investors cannot know whether the claims 
made by doctors and actuaries about the life expectancy of the insured 
are legitimate or whether they have been skewed so that the broker can 
earn larger commissions.128 
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier,129 each party in the chain has the 
incentive to depress the life expectancy of the individual so that the deal 
is larger and a larger commission may be earned.  It follows that, if the 
life expectancy is artificially low, the projected return on the investment 
will be artificially high, and investors will not realize the returns 
expected or promised.  These unrealized expectations can lead to 
investors pulling cash from the investments and causing major problems 
because of the high liquidity requirements of these investments.130 
E. The Impact of the Secondary Life Insurance Market on the Primary 
Life Insurance Market 
The secondary life insurance market may be beneficial to some 
individuals who wish to sell their policy, but does the presence of a 
secondary market negatively impact the primary market?  The answer 
to this question, of course, depends on who is asked. 
Some argue that life settlements will drive up the cost of insurance in 
the primary market and affect the profitability and financial condition of 
the insurers.131  As mentioned earlier, prior to life settlements policy 
owners who no longer wanted to own their policy could either let the 
policy lapse or accept the cash surrender value.132  Based on experience 
and industry studies, insurers build assumptions regarding lapse rates 
into their pricing models.133  If the actual lapse rate falls short of the 
 
127. See Curran, supra note 125. 
128. See id. (stating that investors cannot independently verify assertions that doctors 
and actuaries make, a problem that is compounded by the market’s still developing regulatory 
approaches). 
129. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
130. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text. 
131. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 19; Hanming Fang & Edward Kung, How Does Life 
Settlement Affect the Primary Insurance Market? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 15761, 2010) (stating that life insurance companies claim “that the life settlement 
market, by denying them the return on lapsing or surrendered policies, increases the costs of 
providing policies in the primary market”). 
132. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 19; see also Fang & Kung, supra note 131, at 2. 
133. DELOITTE CONSULTING & THE UNIV. OF CONN., THE LIFE SETTLEMENTS 
MARKET: AN ACTUARIAL PERSPECTIVE ON CONSUMER ECONOMIC VALUE 12 (2005) 
[hereinafter ACTUARIAL PERSPECTIVE] (“Life insurance companies rely on their own lapse 
experience and industry lapse studies when determining appropriate lapse assumptions.”); 
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assumed rate, the insurer may run into financial difficulty because of the 
inability to raise fixed premium payments on other policy owners.134  
Furthermore, insurers have relied on not having to pay some policies 
due to termination or surrender, but a thriving life settlement market 
could “significantly increase the average death claim incurred per 
policy,”135 thereby eroding some of the insurer’s profits.136  The end result 
would be insurance companies seeking to make up that lost profit, which 
would likely result in higher costs for customers in the primary market.137 
On the other hand, industry observers informed the SEC Task Force 
on Life Settlements that “the extent of [the secondary market’s] impact 
is likely to be small.”138  While the secondary market offers a mutually 
beneficial economic opportunity between a policy owner and investors 
that the insurance companies do not provide,139 growth estimates project 
the market to, perhaps generously, achieve a size of between $90 and 
$140 billion by 2016.140  In contrast, in 2011 the total life insurance in 
force in the United States was worth $19.2 trillion.141  In early 2010, only 
 
TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 19–20 (“Life insurers typically base assumed lapse rates on 
experience.”). 
134. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 20; see also ACTUARIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 
133, at 12 (“Ultimately, these pricing assumptions determine the sources of profit and long-
term viability of the life insurance company.”). 
135. Press Release, Conning Research & Consulting, Life Settlements—The Market 
Stabilizes as Insurer Impact Grows (Nov. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.conning.com/pressrelease-detail.aspx?id=5152 [hereinafter Conning]. 
136. Goldstein, supra note 92, at 50; see also Fang & Kung, supra note 131, at 2.  The 
premiums paid in the early years of a fixed premium long-term health insurance policy exceed 
what is actuarially fair.  Id.  Known as “front-loading,” the insured secures premium payments 
that are likely lower than what the insured would be able to acquire later in life.  Fang & 
Kung, supra note 131, at 2.  As a result, over the course of the policy, the actuarial value 
begins to balance out.  Id.  An insured that allows a policy to lapse or accepts the cash 
settlement value allows the life insurance company to retain the front-loaded premiums 
before the actuarial value has an opportunity to balance out.  Id.  By removing from the 
market policies that would otherwise settle or lapse, the secondary market, in theory, harms 
the primary insurance market.  Id. 
137. See Fang and Kung, supra note 131, at 2 (“[T]he life settlement market, by denying 
[the insurance companies] the return on lapsing or surrendered policies, increases the costs of 
providing policies in the primary market.  They allege that these costs will have [to] be passed 
on to consumers . . . .”). 
138. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 20. 
139. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 3.  Some commentators have stated that the life 
insurance industry “is well positioned to create a more efficient secondary market for 
impaired policyholders . . . .”  ACTUARIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 133, at 2. 
140. Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 7. 
141. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 2012, at 66 tbl.7.1 
(2012), available at http://www.acli.com/Tools/Industry%20Facts/Life%20Insurers%20Fact%
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about 1% of all life insurance policies issued by that date were settled.142  
Nominally, it seems unlikely that a secondary market of this size will 
meaningfully undercut the stability of the primary insurance market.143 
Furthermore, some commentators believe that the presence of an 
efficient secondary life insurance market will ultimately be beneficial to 
the primary market.  For example, Neil A. Doherty144 and Hal J. Singer145 
argue that the secondary life insurance market makes the life insurance 
policy a more liquid asset and, therefore, more valuable in the primary 
market.146  Doherty and Singer liken the secondary market for life 
insurance to the secondary market for catastrophe risk insurance.147  
Both secondary markets strengthen their respective primary market by 
assuring the consumer that selling the policy in the future will not result 
in a below market price.148  This limit on downside risk led to higher 
sales of catastrophe risk in the primary market, and a similar outcome 
should be expected in the life insurance primary market.149  Indeed, 
 
20Book/Documents/_factbook2012_entirety_020813.pdf (noting that the $19.2 trillion worth 
of in force policies can be broken down into the following subtotals: individual, $10.99 trillion; 
group, $7.83 trillion; credit, $111.8 billion).   
142. Michael Shumrak, Life Settlements—A Window of Opportunity for the Life 
Insurance Industry?, REINSURANCE NEWS, Feb. 2010, at 14, 16 (stating, despite the relatively 
small size, that the “financial impact of life settlements on life insurer’s future earnings is 
complex and probably not immaterial”). 
143. See id. (noting that growth rates in new settlements suggests that the percentage of 
policies settled “will not increase to a very large percentage”).  But see Conning, supra note 
135 (“The life settlements industry has generally targeted a small number of insurers’ 
universal life policies with higher face amounts . . . .”).  While the percentage of policies 
settled relative to the whole industry may be small, if those policies are targeted at a few 
insurers the impact on those insurers could be more severe. 
144. Neil A. Doherty is the Fredrick H. Ecker Professor of Insurance and Risk 
Management and Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy at The Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania.  Business Economics and Policy Department, WHARTON, 
https://bepp.wharton.upenn.edu/profile/1673/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2013). 
145. Hal J. Singer is the Managing Director and Principal at Navigant Economics.  
Experts, NAVIGANT ECON., http://www.naviganteconomics.com/who/singer_pri.php (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2013). 
146. Doherty & Singer, supra note 81, at 7. 
147. Id. at 15.  The article also likens the life insurance secondary market to the 
secondary market for mortgages.  Id.  Written in 2002, the article pre-dates the recent 
financial crisis that was caused in part by the securitization of very risky home mortgages.  
See  Knowledge  @Wharton,  Securitization  2.0,  FORBES.COM  (Apr.  3,  2008),  http://www.f
orbes.com/2008/04/03/credit-crisis-subprime-ent-fin-cx_kw_0403whartonsecuritize.html 
(“[S]ecuritization of subprime real estate loans is blamed for the global liquidity crisis . . . .”); 
see also discussion supra Part II.D. 
148. Doherty & Singer, supra note 81, at 15. 
149. Id. 
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other studies have determined that the life insurance secondary market 
will benefit both consumers and insurers by allowing consumers to 
obtain higher prices for their policies, in turn strengthening demand for 
the policies on the primary market.150 
III. JUDICIAL AND INSURANCE INDUSTRY EFFORTS REGARDING THE 
SECONDARY LIFE INSURANCE MARKET 
The current demand and expected growth of the secondary life 
insurance market suggests that it is here to stay.151  Therefore, the best 
option appears to be embracing the market while regulating it in a way 
that prevents and eliminates fraud, but encourages lawful and beneficial 
settlements.  Indeed, by addressing and proscribing STOLI transactions, 
this appears to be the approach adopted by courts, state legislatures, and 
the life settlement industry.152 
A. Case Law—Examples from Delaware and New York 
1. Delaware 
American courts adopted the English common law view that a valid 
life insurance policy requires an insurable interest.153  An 1876 Supreme 
Court decision reflects this understanding by stating that “statutes to the 
same effect [as those insurable interest statutes passed in England] have 
been passed in some of the States; but where they have not been, in 
most cases either the English statutes have been considered as 
operative, or the older common law has been followed.”154  This decision 
was followed shortly after by Warnock v. Davis, one of the earliest 
examples of the attempted assignment of a life insurance policy.155  The 
 
150. See, e.g., Nadine Gatzert et al., The Impact of the Secondary Market on Life 
Insurers’ Surrender Profits, 76 J. RISK & INS. 887, 905–06 (2009) (pointing out that life 
insurers would need to “abandon lapse-supported pricing”). 
151. See supra notes 101–04 and accompanying text (regarding the size of the market 
and the graying population). 
152. See discussion infra Parts III.A–B. 
153. Peter Nash Swisher, The Insurable Interest Requirement for Life Insurance: A 
Critical Reassessment, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 477, 481 (2005).  Before the eighteenth century, 
there were no insurable interest laws in England and wagering contracts on the lives of others 
were allowed (for example, whether an individual would ultimately be convicted and 
executed of a capital offense).  Id.  In 1774, the British Parliament passed a statute requiring 
an insurable interest.  Id. 
154. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460 (1876). 
155. See generally Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775 (1881). 
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Warnock decision involved the assignment of a life insurance policy to 
an individual with no insurable interest who agreed to pay the 
premiums.156  The Court considered this agreement to be a wager policy 
and held it invalid.157  Importantly, the Court went even further and 
stated that “[t]he assignment of a policy to a party not having an 
insurable interest is as objectionable as the taking out of a policy in his 
name.”158 
The Court later backtracked on the Warnock wager comparison in 
Grigsby v. Russell,159 a move that has since been judicially reinforced, 
and in many instances codified.160  As these cases and statutes illustrate, 
an insurable interest is always present when one takes out a life 
insurance policy on one’s own life.161  As a result, in the secondary life 
insurance market, insurable interest typically becomes a problem when 
a third person attempts to procure a policy on an individual whom the 
 
156. See id. at 778–79. 
157. Id. at 779. 
158. Id. 
159. See supra Part II.C.  Specifically, the Grigsby court’s suggestion that the holder of a 
valid life insurance policy should be able to transfer the policy to “one whom [the insured], 
the party most concerned, is not afraid to trust” indicates that the transferee’s insurable 
interest in the transferor is irrelevant.  Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 155 (1911). 
160. See, e.g., Bajwa v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 776 N.E.2d 609, 617 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) 
(“[O]ne may insure his own life for the benefit of another having no insurable interest 
therein.”  (quoting Colgrove v. Lowe, 175 N.E. 569, 571 (Ill. 1931))); Estate of Bean v. Hazel, 
972 S.W.2d 290, 291 (Mo. 1998) (“[A] person may purchase an insurance policy on his own 
life and name as beneficiary a person who has no insurable interest in the person’s life 
‘provided it not be done by way of cover for a wagering policy.’” (quoting Lakin v. Postal Life 
& Cas. Ins. Co., 316 S.W.2d 542, 552 (Mo. 1958))).  For statutes, see for example, DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 18 § 2704(a) (1999) (“Any individual of competent legal capacity may procure or 
effect an insurance contract upon his/her own life or body for the benefit of any person, but 
no person shall procure or cause to be procured any insurance contract upon the life or body 
of another individual unless the benefits under such contract are payable to the individual 
insured or his/her personal representatives or to a person having, at the time when such 
contract was made, an insurable interest in the individual insured.”) and N.Y. INS. LAW 
§ 3205(b) (Consol. 2000) (“(1) Any person of lawful age may on his own initiative procure or 
effect a contract of insurance upon his own person for the benefit of any person, firm, 
association or corporation.  Nothing herein shall be deemed to prohibit the immediate 
transfer or assignment of a contract so procured and effectuated [and] (2) [n]o person shall 
procure or cause to be procured, directly or by assignment or otherwise[,] any contract of 
insurance upon the person of another unless the benefits under such contract are payable to 
the person insured or his personal representatives, or to a person having, at the time when 
such contract is made, an insurable interest in the person insured.”). 
161. HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 16, § 2.04 (“[A] person has an insurable interest 
in his own life, which means that he can insure his own life for the benefit of whomever he 
chooses and to whatever amount the insurer will write.”). 
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purchaser has no insurable interest. 
To illustrate, the 2011 Delaware case Sun Life Assurance Company 
of Canada v. Berck illustrates a common challenge that STOLI policies 
face in the courts: the lack of an insurable interest voiding the 
incontestability clause.162 
In Berck, a group of investors assisted 77-year-old Daniel Berman in 
applying for a life insurance policy with the intention of purchasing the 
policy from Berman to sell to other investors on the life settlement 
market.163  On June 6, 2007, a $4 million policy was issued to Berman 
with an incontestability clause164 that stated, in part, “In the absence of 
fraud, after this Policy has been in force during the lifetime of the 
Insured for a period of two years from its Issue Date, [the insurance 
company] cannot contest it except for non-payment of Premiums.”165  
During the procurement of the policy, Berman indicated that the policy 
was for an estate plan, and an attached Broker’s Report that was signed 
by one of the investors corroborated Berman’s indication.166  Upon 
Berman’s death, the insurance company argued that the policy was void 
ab initio167 because of a lack of insurable interest.168  The investors argued 
that an insurable interest existed and that the incontestability clause 
barred the insurance company from claiming the policy is invalid.169 
The court found that there was no insurable interest at the time of 
the policy’s creation.170  The court defined an insurable interest as 
benefits payable to individuals related by blood, law, or “‘substantial 
interest engendered by love and affection[]’ or [] other individuals with 
‘a lawful and substantial economic interest’” in the continuing life of the 
 
162. See Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d 728, 733 (D. Del. 
2011); see also PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Morello 2007 Irrevocable Trust, 645 F.3d 965, 967 
(8th Cir. 2011); Ohio Nat’l Life Assurance Corp. v. Davis, No. 10C2386, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 73197, at *12 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 2011). 
163. Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 729. 
164. Id. at 730.  Delaware requires two-year incontestability clauses in life insurance 
contracts.  Id. at 731.  The Delaware statute reads in part: “There shall be a provision that the 
policy shall be incontestable after it has been in force during the lifetime of the insured for a 
period of not more than 2 years after its date of issue.”  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 2908(a) 
(1999). 
165. Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 730. 
166. Id. 
167. Latin for “[f]rom the beginning.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 5 (9th ed. 2009). 
168. Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 731. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 733. 
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insured.171  As the court stated, the insurable interest requirement is 
meant to prevent life insurance contracts from being used as wagering 
contracts that give policyholders “‘a sinister counter interest in having 
the life come to an end.’”172  It is precisely this concern that faces STOLI 
policies.  Furthermore, lack of insurable interest is an issue at the time 
that the policy is acquired, and in this case the disinterested third parties 
and their STOLI scheme presented no insurable interest in the Berman 
policy.173 
Because there was no insurable interest, the court held that the 
policy was void ab initio.174  The court pointed out that, with New York 
as an exception, an insurable interest in the insured is required for 
enforcement of a life insurance contract.175  Furthermore, because 
invoking an incontestability clause “presupposes a basically valid 
contract[,]” the court held the incontestability clause to be 
inapplicable.176  Since the policy was void from the beginning the court 
held that the incontestability period did not prevent the insurance 
company from challenging the policy.177  Finally, the “in the absence of 
fraud” proviso178 contained in the incontestability clause appeared to be 
the nail in the coffin for the investor’s argument.179 
Importantly, the court held that when an insured does not plan on 
using the policy as a cover for a wager—a non-STOLI case—“it is well 
established that . . . the beneficial interest may be legally transferred to 
an individual or entity without an insurable interest.”180  Clearly, then, 
 
171. Id. (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 2704(c) (1999)).  Though “insurable interest” 
is “difficult to define with precision,” PLITT ET AL., supra note 14, at § 41.20, the Berck court’s 
view accurately reflects the modern view of the insurable interest, see, e.g., id. at § 41:21 
(noting that the majority of cases indicate that spouses and blood relatives usually have an 
insurable interest, as do individuals with an affinity for the person). 
172. Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 733–34 (quoting Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 154 
(1911)); see also supra notes 71–78 and accompanying text. 
173. See Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 733, 735. 
174. Id. at 733.  “The issue of whether a plaintiff is legally entitled to contest the validity 
of an insurance contract on grounds of fraud or misrepresentation after the two-year 
incontestability period is a matter of first impression in Delaware.”  Id. at 732. 
175. Id.; see also infra notes 209–31 and accompanying text (discussing the New York 
rule). 
176. Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 732–33 (quoting Beard v. Am. Agency Life Ins. Co., 550 
A.2d 677, 689 (Md. 1988)). 
177. Id. at 733. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 734. 
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the court indicated a bright line between STOLI transactions and 
viatical and life settlement transactions. 
The position of Delaware is further developed in a pair of 
September 2011 cases that involved intricate trust organizations trying 
to evade STOLI prohibitions.181  In PHL Variable Insurance Co. v. Dawe 
2006 Insurance Trust, the insurance company, PHL, issued a $9 million 
policy on the life of Price Dawe with the Price Dawe Trust as the 
policy’s owner and beneficiary.182  The policy had an incontestability 
provision that activated after two years and was effective except against 
fraud.183  Three and a half years after the policy was issued, and 
following Dawe’s death, PHL contested the policy, arguing that it was a 
STOLI and was never intended for legitimate insurance needs.184 
The facts of Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Schlanger 2006 
Insurance Trust are very similar to Dawe and include the insurance 
company, Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, issuing a $6 
million policy on Schlanger’s life with the Schlanger Trust as the 
beneficiary.185  In both cases, the insurance companies argued that a trust 
scheme was established to conceal STOLI transactions.186  Basically, the 
scheme established an insurance trust, and the beneficiary of the 
insurance trust was a family trust.187  After the insurance policy was 
issued to the insurance trust, the insured sold his interest in the family 
trust to a third party who paid the premiums on the policy.188 
The Dawe court answered three certified questions, two of which are 
applicable here, and the first being the same question certified in the 
Lincoln case.189 The first certified question was whether Delaware law 
 
181. See generally PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Dawe 2006 Ins. Trust, 28 A.3d 1059 (Del. 
2011); Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Schlanger 2006 Ins. Trust, 28 A.3d 436 (Del. 2011). 
182. Dawe, 28 A.3d at 1063. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Schlanger, 28 A.3d at 437. 
186. Dawe, 28 A.3d at 1063–64; Schlanger, 28 A.3d at 438. 
187. Schlanger, 28 A.3d at 438. 
188. Id. 
189. Dawe, 28 A.3d at 1064; Schlanger, 28 A.3d at 438.  The third certified question—
inapplicable to the scope of this Comment—asked whether Delaware law  
“confer[s] upon the trustee of a Delaware trust established by an individual insured 
an insurable interest in the life of that individual when, at the time of the application 
for life insurance, the insured intends that the beneficial interest in the Delaware 
trust would be transferred to a third-party investor with no insurable interest in that 
individual’s life following the issuance of the life insurance policy[.]”   
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permitted an insurer to challenge the validity of a life insurance interest 
after the incontestability period had lapsed.190  The Delaware Supreme 
Court held that the insurable interest requirement of a life insurance 
policy may be challenged after the incontestability period had lapsed.191  
The court considered this decision to be “consistent with that reached 
by the majority of courts.”192  The court reasoned that an incontestability 
period required a valid contract, but under Delaware common law, 
“contracts that offend public policy or harm the public are deemed void 
as opposed to voidable.”193  Because no policy was ever effectuated, the 
incontestability clause also never came into effect.194 
The second certified question was whether an individual may 
procure a life insurance policy on his own life with no intent to provide 
insurance protection to a party with an insurable interest and 
immediately transfer the policy to a party with no insurable interest.195  
The court answered this question in the negative, effectively adding an 
intent component to the validity of a life settlement deal.196  It is critical 
to note, however, that the court stated that the intent of the insured is 
“not the relevant inquiry.”197  Instead, the relevant inquiry is 
determining who procured the policy and whether that person possessed 
an insurable interest.198  This addition helps to avoid a “triumph of form 
over substance.”199 
To clarify, the court’s distinction focuses on preventing third parties 
from using an insured as nothing more than a straw man to get around 
the insurable interest requirement.  Otherwise, a disinterested third 
party who requests that an individual purchase a policy and then 
immediately assign that same policy to the disinterested third party is 
effectively the same as the disinterested third party acquiring a policy on 
the insured’s life.200  Indeed, the court nicely summarized its view by 
 
Dawe, 28 A.3d at 1064. 
190. Dawe, 28 A.3d at 1064. 
191. Id. at 1065. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 1067. 
194. Id. at 1068. 
195. Id. at 1064. 
196. Id. at 1068, 1071. 
197. Id. at 1076. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 1071. 
200. Id. at 1073–74.  Such an arrangement violates the statutory framework that most 
states have adopted.  See supra note 160 and accompanying text (describing Delaware and 
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stating that a validly issued life insurance policy “is assignable to 
anyone, with or without an insurable interest, at any time.  The key 
distinction is that a third party cannot use the insured as a means . . . to 
procure a policy that, when issued, would otherwise lack an insurable 
interest.”201  In other words, no straw man may be used and STOLI 
transactions are not allowed.  Importantly, traditional viatical and life 
settlement transactions were not proscribed by the court’s decision. 
The media coverage and industry responses to the Delaware 
decisions further illustrate the distinction between STOLI transactions 
and the traditional viatical and life settlement transactions.  Shortly after 
the Delaware Supreme Court’s decisions, the Wall Street Journal 
published an article titled “Ruling Is Defeat for Death-Bet Investors.”202  
The article identified the rulings as significant because Delaware serves 
as a home to many trust companies, and, as these cases illustrated, trusts 
were being used by many to conceal an underlying STOLI transaction.203  
Counsel for the insurance company in Dawe described the decision as “a 
great win for us.”204  On the other hand, the article also quoted one 
attorney who believed that the removal of the two-year incontestability 
clause could make it very difficult for investors holding older policies to 
receive payouts.205 
Interestingly, National Underwriter, an insurance industry 
publication, started its article covering the Delaware decisions by stating 
that “[t]he life settlement industry is welcoming a pair of recent 
Delaware Supreme Court decisions, despite reports suggesting that the 
decisions were a blow.”206  The life settlement industry viewed the 
decisions as a victory because the decisions referred to the existing life 
settlement market as “perfectly legal” and “highly regulated.”207  In the 
life settlement industry’s view, the decision confirmed the validity and 
helped advance what the industry had been working to achieve: a 
 
New York statutes related to third parties acquiring life insurance contracts on the lives of 
others).   
201. Id. at 1074. 
202. Leslie Scism, Ruling Is Defeat for Death-Bet Investors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2011, 
at C1. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Elizabeth Festa, Delaware Court Weighs in on Life Settlement Cases, NAT’L 
UNDERWRITER, Oct. 10, 2011, at 18, 18. 
207. Id. (quoting PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Dawe 2006 Ins. Trust, 28 A.3d 1059, 1069 
(Del. 2011)). 
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legitimate secondary life settlement market without the presence of 
STOLI policies.208 
2. New York 
Delaware’s decisions on STOLI transactions and the secondary life 
insurance market generally were at odds with New York case law until 
the legislature brought the state’s law in line with Delaware.209  In New 
England Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Caruso, the issue was whether an 
incontestability clause may bar the insurance company’s claim that the 
policy is unenforceable because the original policyholder had sold the 
policy to an individual with no insurable interest in the insured.210  The 
Caruso court maintained an established New York rule that once the 
incontestability period on an insurance policy passes, the insurer is 
barred from asserting the policy owner’s lack of insurable interest.211 
The insurance company argued that paying the policyholder who has 
no insurable interest in the insured would violate the New York 
Insurance Law and be contrary to public policy.212  The court responded 
to each argument in turn.  First, the court stated that the New York 
insurance law does not make contracts void for an individual lacking an 
insurable interest in the insured.213  Second, the court found no public 
policy problem with the assignment of a valid life insurance policy by 
the owner to a disinterested third party with no insurable interest in the 
insured.214  The court pointed out that an arrangement between the 
owner and third party established a contract and that insufficient public 
policy reasons existed to void a legal contract between the two parties.215  
The court went on to say: 
 
208. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
209. Compare supra Part III.A.1, with New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Caruso, 535 
N.E.2d 270, 271 (N.Y. 1989), and infra notes 230–31 and accompanying text (demonstrating 
the difference between Delaware and New York judicial decisions before the New York 
legislature acted to bring the New York rule regarding STOLI polices in line with what is 
seen in other jurisdictions, like Delaware).   
210. See Caruso, 535 N.E.2d at 271; see also Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Berck, 
770 F. Supp. 2d 728, 732 (D. Del. 2011).  In Berck the issue was whether Delaware law 
permits an insurer to challenge the validity of a life insurance interest after the 
incontestability period has lapsed.  See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
211. Caruso, 535 N.E.2d at 271. 
212. Id. at 272. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 274. 
215. Id. at 273–74. 
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The statute requires that the policyholder have an insurable 
interest in the life of decedent only at the time the contract was 
made and to require evidence of insurable interest at this late 
date could not only impose an undue burden on the policyholder 
but also run counter to the policy considerations underlying 
incontestability requirements.216 
The court did not believe that it would be appropriate to put the 
investor who purchased the life insurance policy in a position that 
required the investor to prove an insurable interest after the policy had 
been in effect for longer than the incontestability period, especially with 
the deceased insured being unable to corroborate the arrangement that 
the parties had freely entered into.217 
In Kramer v. Phoenix Life Insurance Co., New York’s highest court 
confirmed what was said in Caruso.218  In Kramer, a New York attorney, 
Arthur Kramer, took out several life insurance policies on his own life 
and immediately assigned the beneficial interests of the policies to 
individuals without an insurable interest in his life.219  Upon Kramer’s 
death, his wife, Alice Kramer, sought the insurance proceeds because 
the individuals who held the beneficial interest lacked an insurable 
interest in Kramer.220  Mrs. Kramer argued that this lack of insurable 
interest violated New York insurance law and would result in her 
receiving the policy benefits.221 
After an interlocutory appeal was granted by the district court to the 
Second Circuit, the Second Circuit certified the following question to 
the New York Court of Appeals: 
Does New York Insurance Law § 3205(b)(1) and (b)(2) prohibit 
an insured from procuring a policy on his own life and 
immediately transferring the policy to a person without an 
insurable interest in the insured’s life, if the insured did not ever 
intend to provide insurance protection for a person with an 
insurable interest in the insured’s life?222 
In response to this question, the court of appeals held that New 
 
216. Id. at 274 (internal citations omitted). 
217. Id. 
218. See Kramer v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 940 N.E.2d 535, 536–37 (N.Y. 2010). 
219. See id. at 537.  The aggregate value of the policies taken out was $56,200,000.  Id. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 536. 
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York law allows a policy owner to immediately transfer a life insurance 
policy on his own life to a third party with no insurable interest in the 
insured’s life, “even where the policy was obtained for just such a 
purpose.”223 
To support its decision, the Kramer majority looked at the language 
of both section 3205(b)(1) and section 3205(b)(2).224  Section 3205(b)(1) 
allows for any individual of lawful age to buy an insurance policy on his 
own life for the benefit of any entity, and nothing in the insurance laws 
prevent the individual from immediately transferring or assigning the 
properly acquired policy.225  On the other hand, section 3205(b)(2) 
requires a third party to have an insurable interest in the insured.226  This 
case clearly fell within 3205(b)(1) and, under the language of the 
section, therefore did not require the assignee to have an insurable 
interest in the insured party.227 
This decision by the court is consistent with both the legal and public 
policy holdings from Caruso.228  Furthermore, it continues to build upon 
the foundation from Grigsby by viewing life insurance policies as 
property and refusing to question the appropriate assignment of a valid 
life insurance policy to a party with no insurable interest.229  However, 
the language used by the court, especially the allowance of immediate 
transfers, leaves the door open for STOLI transactions. 
Shortly after the decision in Kramer, a change to the New York 
insurance law regarding life settlements took effect and prohibited 
STOLI transactions.230  As a result, an individual is still not be prevented 
 
223. Id. at 536–37. 
224. Id. at 539. 
225. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3205(b)(1) (Consol. 2000) (“Any person of lawful age may on his 
own initiative procure or effect a contract of insurance upon his own person for the benefit of 
any person, firm, association or corporation.  Nothing herein shall be deemed to prohibit the 
immediate transfer or assignment of a contract so procured or effectuated.”). 
226. Kramer, 940 N.E.2d at 539.  Section 3205(b)(2) states: “No person shall procure or 
cause to be procured, directly or by assignment or otherwise any contract of insurance upon 
the person of another unless the benefits under such a contract are payable to the person 
insured or his personal representatives, or to a person having, at the time when such a 
contract is made, an insurable interest in the person insured.”  N.Y. INS. LAW § 3205(b)(2). 
227. See supra notes 219–23 and accompanying text. 
228. See Kramer, 940 N.E.2d at 540; see supra notes 210–17 and accompanying text 
(discussing Caruso).   
229. See Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 155–56 (1911). 
230. See Life Settlements Act, ch. 499, 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1530, 1546 (codified as 
amended at N.Y. INS. LAW § 7815(c) (Consol. 2012)) (“No person shall directly or indirectly 
engage in any act, practice or arrangement that constitutes stranger-originated life 
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from immediately transferring his policy to another party, but the 
assignor’s intent at the time of the policy’s creation would have to be for 
the benefit of an insurable interest, and not for a STOLI transaction, for 
the transfer to be valid.231 
B. Insurance Industry Regulation Efforts 
The courts are not the only group that disapproves of STOLI 
policies.  Insurance industry organizations have also taken note of 
STOLIs and published comprehensive model acts to provide regulation 
to the secondary market, especially STOLI transactions.  One group, the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)232 has created 
the NAIC Viatical Settlements Model Act.233  Similarly, the National 
Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL)234 has also adopted its 
own life settlements model act.235  Both the NAIC and NCOIL intend 
for their model acts to serve as guides for state legislatures.236  Each will 
be briefly discussed in turn.   
The NAIC Model Act provides a wide range of rules, covering the 
licensing of viatical settlement brokers and providers,237 prohibited 
practices for market participants,238 fraud prevention, and remedies.239  
 
insurance.”). 
231. N.Y. INS. LAW § 7815(b) (“Stranger-originated life insurance arrangements do not 
include lawful life settlement contracts as permitted by this article or those practices set forth 
. . . [in] this article, . . . provided that such contracts or practices are not for the purpose of 
evading regulation under this article.”). 
232. The NAIC is composed of elected or appointed state officials who set regulatory 
standards throughout the United States.  About the NAIC, NAIC, http://www.naic.org/index_
about.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2013). 
233. The NAIC adopted the Viatical Settlements Act in December 1993 and amended 
the model extensively in June 1998 and again in March 2001.  VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS 
MODEL ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY § 17 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009).  Of particular 
importance here, in June 2007 the Model was amended again to address STOLI policies.  Id.  
234. NCOIL is a group that defines itself as the “voice of state legislators in Washington 
in the face of mounting federal initiatives to preempt state insurance regulation.”  History and 
Purpose, NCOIL, http://www.ncoil.org/ncoilinfo/about.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2013). 
235. See generally LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT (Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators 
2007). 
236. Kenneth W. Kingma & Stephan R. Leimberg, Deterring STOLI: Two New Model 
Life Settlements Acts, EST. PLAN., July 2008, at 3, 3.  
237. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 3 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009); see 
also WINN, supra note 2, at 54–55 (summarizing the licensing and bonding requirements of 
section 3 of the Viatical Settlements Model Act). 
238. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT §§ 11–12 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 
2009). 
239. Id. §§ 14–15. 
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While all states have different laws regarding life settlements, the Act 
has, for the most part, been the basis for most state regulation of the 
industry.240 
Aside from standardizing and regulating activity within the 
secondary life insurance market, the NAIC Model Act also attempts to 
eradicate STOLI policies.241  To accomplish this goal, the NAIC Act 
prohibits a policyholder from selling his policy in the secondary market 
before five years have passed from the date the policy was issued.242  The 
idea behind this policy is to allow for legitimate settlements to occur 
while at the same time hampering the financial benefit that is associated 
with STOLI policies by forcing the investor to employ prohibitively high 
amounts of money.243  Interestingly, the NAIC Model Act does provide 
exceptions to the five-year prohibition when certain events, such as 
being diagnosed as terminally ill or having a spouse die, occur.244   
Much like the NAIC Model Act, the primary focus of the NCOIL 
Model Act is to deter and prevent STOLI transactions.245  For example, 
the NAIC act contains similar recommendations on advertising, such as 
prohibiting the use of words that imply “free” or “no cost” insurance.246   
However, some notable differences do exist between the model acts.  
Chief among these differences is the NCOIL act only placing a two-year 
waiting period on the settlement of new policies.247  Importantly, the 
NCOIL act also possesses a broader scope.  The NAIC act addresses the 
most basic STOLI transaction: the acquisition of a policy at the request 
of an investor for the sole purpose of selling that policy to the investor.248  
On the other hand, the NCOIL act attempts to cover “all manifestations 
of STOLI, whether they involve direct settlements of life insurance, or 
 
240. WINN, supra note 2, at 53. 
241. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009); 
WINN, supra note 2, at 58. 
242. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009); 
WINN, supra note 2, at 58. 
243. See WINN, supra note 2, at 72. 
244. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009) 
(other examples include a divorce, retirement from full-time employment, or physical or 
mental disability). 
245. The NCOIL Model Act contains the following drafting note: “It is an essential 
public policy objective to protect consumers against stranger-originated life insurance 
(STOLI).”  LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT (Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators 2007). 
246. Id. § 8. 
247. Id. § 11(N). 
248. Kingma & Leimberg, supra note 236, at 4–5. 
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indirect sales of life insurance to investors through a sale of interest in 
trust . . . or through other practices.”249  This broader scope takes on 
greater significance in light of recent cases.250  
IV. LOOKING FORWARD: THE BENEFITS OF A MARKET-BASED 
APPROACH 
Properly created life settlements can offer a promising deal for two 
competent parties.251  Furthermore, because of the utility offered by 
these products, there should be an incentive to cultivate a market to 
allow people to benefit from the utility that the market presents.  
However, at least two major roadblocks are holding back the life 
settlement market: the questionable legality of life settlements and the 
persistent fraud that has plagued the industry.252  When addressing these 
dual roadblocks facing the maturation of the life settlement market, the 
most prevalent issue in front of courts appears to be the lack of 
insurable interests found in STOLI transactions.253  Underlying these 
concerns are the competing interests between allowing the life 
settlement market to develop and protecting the interests of primary 
insurance providers.  The best way to balance these interests is to couple 
a strict judicial adherence to incontestability clauses with a five-year 
holding period on newly acquired life insurance policies.  This 
arrangement would provide investors with certainty and make STOLI 
transactions less financially attractive. 
As National Underwriter pointed out, in some ways the life 
settlement industry welcomed the Dawe and Schlanger decisions.254  The 
industry has been trying to rid itself of STOLI policies for some time, 
 
249. Id. at 4–5. 
250. See generally, e.g., PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Dawe 2006 Ins. Trust, 28 A.3d 1059 
(Del. 2011).  For an example of trust schemes used by investors, see supra notes 185–88 and 
accompanying text. 
251. See supra Part II.A. 
252. See Lazarus, supra note 79, at 273–74 (discussing the role that securitization could 
play in the growth of the life settlement market and noting that some of the factors holding 
back the move toward securitizing life settlements include legal concerns).  This Comment 
already discussed the questionable legality of life settlements and the fraud that is present in 
the market.  For a discussion on the legality issues facing the market, especially STOLI 
policies, see supra Part III.  For a discussion on fraud, see supra Part II.D. 
253. See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text (explaining that the life settlements 
are freely assignable at any time and that the problem comes in when there is no insurable 
interest at the time the contract was made). 
254. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
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and court decisions that help expose elaborate trust schemes as nothing 
but enablers for STOLI policies help that cause.  However, the 
Delaware decision creates serious dangers to the life settlement 
industry’s survival.  For this reason, the Delaware view on 
incontestability clauses is both different and inferior to the approach 
articulated in New York courts.  Again, the Delaware Supreme Court 
held that a life insurer may contest “the validity of a life insurance policy 
based on a lack of insurable interest after the expiration of the two-year 
[in]contestability period.”255  New York, on the other hand, firmly 
upheld the incontestability period, stating that “passage of the 
incontestability period bars the insurer from thereafter asserting the 
policyholder’s lack of an insurable interest.”256 
This distinction represents a significant difference between the states 
because both the New York and Delaware legislatures have joined the 
general trend away from STOLI policies.257  However, once STOLI 
policies are out of the picture, the vast majority of what remains are 
legitimate life settlements.  These life settlements, which were properly 
acquired by an individual and later sold to an investor, may be 
negatively impacted by the lack of an incontestability period.  As 
discussed earlier, the life insurance industry does not approve of the 
secondary market.258  With the Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling, the 
industry will be more emboldened to challenge life settlements after the 
insured dies.259 
One of the main problems with lifting the incontestability period is 
that it introduces a tremendous amount of uncertainty into the life 
settlement market.260  Not only will potential investors now view a life 
settlement with even more suspicion, but existing investors, who 
followed the rules set forth by the industry and state regulators, may 
now be left susceptible to a legal challenge when attempting to receive 
payment.   
This problem is particularly concerning when it appears that 
eliminating the incontestability provisions is unnecessary in light of the 
simple options available to the insurance industry.  It would not be 
 
255. PHL Variable Ins. Co., 28 A.3d at 1064–65. 
256. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Caruso, 535 N.E.2d 270, 271 (N.Y. 1989). 
257. See Dawe, 28 A.3d at 1074–75 (“After Kramer the New York legislature revised the 
state’s insurance laws to prohibit STOLI transactions”). 
258. See discussion supra Part II.E. 
259. Scism, supra note 202. 
260. See id. 
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difficult for a life insurance application to include language that could 
constrain, or even eliminate, the possibility that the policy be settled on 
the secondary market.  For example, an insurance company could 
include in its application a provision that the insurance policy shall not 
be assigned to an individual without an insurable interest in the insured 
or that any assignment of the insurance policy must be approved by the 
insurance company first.  No valid reason exists to explain why these 
policies cannot be included in a contract between two knowledgeable 
actors. 
The ability of the insurance market to function as a market makes 
New York’s rule regarding a firm incontestability period the most 
appropriate because it allows for the market to operate.  Such an 
approach seems to offer two possible ends.  First, the industry locks out 
the ability for people to settle life insurance policies on a secondary 
market, and the life settlement market fades away.  Alternatively, if 
enough of the individuals acquiring life insurance demand policies that 
can be settled on the secondary market, some insurers will undoubtedly 
supply such policies. 
Either result would provide certainty to investors because they 
would know that after the incontestability period, the policy that they 
purchase will pay out upon the death of the insured.  Furthermore, 
either result is preferable to the Delaware decision to look past the 
incontestability provision.  A strong incontestability period allows the 
market, and not courts or other government entities, to determine the 
fate of the secondary market for life insurance.261  In short, the life 
settlement market’s fate should be determined by its interaction with 
the primary life insurance market and whether people seeking life 
insurance from the primary market provide adequate demand for 
policies that provide for the ability to later settle the policies on a 
secondary market.  A strong incontestability period helps to achieve this 
goal by deterring STOLI transactions while providing repose to 
investors who are able to provide meaningful value to the insured. 
However, to effectively deter STOLI policies, the holding period for 
new policies must be long enough to discourage investors from initiating 
such policies.  In this sense, state legislatures262 should codify the NAIC’s 
 
261. This result should be welcomed, especially since, as the Supreme Court held in 
Grigsby, life insurance policies are personal property.  Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 156 
(1911). 
262. The McCarran-Ferguson Act makes insurance the exclusive domain of the states.  
McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33, 33–34 (1945) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) 
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qualified five-year prohibition on selling newly acquired life insurance 
policies.263  This method is viewed by many as one of the best ways to 
eliminate STOLI policies because it diminishes their economic 
incentive.264  At the same time, bona fide settlements are still an 
available option to those who choose to engage in such a transaction.265  
Some argue that such a restriction on the sale of a life insurance 
policy is “anti-consumer” because it prevents the owner of a life 
insurance policy from freely selling his policy.266  While this argument 
has merits, there are reasons why it is unconvincing.  First, without 
effective eradication of STOLI policies, it seems possible that the life 
settlement market will either cease to exist or never grow to its 
potential.  Since the five-year holding period provides an effective way 
of eradicating STOLI policies, it will help create and preserve a market 
that makes settling policies not only possible, but also legitimate.  
Indeed, developing and preserving such a market is fundamentally pro-
consumer.   
Second, exceptions can help alleviate any “anti-consumer” effects of 
the five-year moratorium.  For example, both the NAIC and NCOIL 
model acts contains several “life events” that allow policyholders to sell 
their policies.267  These exceptions include becoming terminally ill, 
becoming bankrupt or insolvent, and undergoing divorce.268  Because 
these exceptions are based on events that the policyholder either does 
not control or that carry serious implications, the chance of people 
attempting to engage in an event for the purpose of settling a policy 
before the five-year period lapses seems unlikely.  Still, the exceptions 
prevent complete foreclosure on the ability of a consumer to settle a 
policy when he is in a situation that requires urgent action. 
 
(2006)); Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 297 (4th Cir. 2007).  As a result, while 
slow, piecemeal adoption through individual state legislatures, as opposed to federal action, is 
necessary. 
263. WINN, supra note 2, at 72. 
264. Id.  While it may still be practical for some investors to endure a five-year lag, it 
seems unlikely that many investors would be willing to tie up significant amounts of capital 
for five years in an asset in which the investor has no legal title for a deal.   
265. Id. 
266. Id. 
267. Id.; VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009); 
NCOIL LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11(N)(2) (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009). 
268. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009); 
NCOIL LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11(N)(2) (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009); 
WINN, supra note 2, at 72. 
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Insurance industry groups are already taking steps to eradicate 
STOLI policies.  The courts and state legislatures can help legitimize the 
life settlement market by coupling a strict judicial understanding of a 
policy’s incontestability clause with a modest regulation like the five-
year holding period.269 
V. CONCLUSION 
At its core, the life settlement market provides an opportunity for a 
life insurance policy to be transferred from the owner to an investor.  
Driving this transfer is the mutual economic benefit available between 
the cash settlement value and the value payable upon the death of the 
insured.   
To understand how to best promote the growth of this market, this 
Comment began with a discussion of the life insurance industry before 
detailing the origin of the life settlement market.  This discussion was 
followed by a description of the parties involved in the process of 
settling a life insurance policy.  Some examples of the problems facing 
the secondary life insurance market, as well as the secondary market’s 
interaction with the primary market, were then detailed.   
Next, this Comment moved into case law by examining the view of 
the courts on STOLI policies and explaining how the view of the courts 
compares with the view of the life settlement industry.  Decisions from 
the highest courts in both New York and Delaware were then detailed 
after a brief discussion of a few of the foundational Supreme Court 
cases. 
After considering the differences between the decisions and how 
those differences could impact the growth and viability of the secondary 
market, this Comment moved into the variety of efforts being used to 
help rid the market of STOLI transactions.  Among these efforts, the 
model acts of the NAIC and NCOIL were highlighted.   
Finally, this Comment recommended coupling a strict judicial 
adherence to incontestability clauses with state codification of a five-
year holding period on newly issued policies.  This approach would help 
stabilize the market by providing certainty to investors of validly settled 
 
269. Such a market could help create products that are conducive to securitization, 
which is a goal that many commentators have sought because of the independent agency 
ratings and access to market exchanges that come along with the ability to securitize.  See 
generally Franklin L. Best, Jr., Securitization of Life Insurance Policies, 44 TORT TRIAL & 
INS. PRAC. L.J. 911; Lazarus, supra note 79.  
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policies while at the same time reducing the financial benefit offered by 
STOLI transactions.   
The end result will mean a stable market comprised of validly settled 
life insurance policies.  Such a market provides an opportunity for two 
competent parties to achieve a mutual economic benefit.   
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